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THE HEART OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: 
AFFIRMING EQUALITY AND FREEDOM IN PUBLIC 
EDUCATION 
William E. Thro* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Once you start dividing the community from whom the 
Constitution works into "goodies" and "badies," then I think 
you wander away from the heart of the constitutional 
enterprise. 
-Justice Albie Sachs, Constitutional Court of South Africa 1 
Justice Sachs wrote those words to describe his approach 
when writing the opinion establishing a constitutional right to 
same-sex marriage in South Africa.2 He did not want an 
opinion that regarded gay rights advocates as "a manipulative 
lobby group" or their religious opponents as "a bunch of 
benighted bigots."3 Rather, he wanted both sides to feel that 
their "convictions, values, and perspectives are being taken 
seriously and treated thoughtfully and with respect."4 While 
South Africa's Constitution mandated a particular result, it 
was imperative that no individual feel isolated from the 
constitutional community. Affirmation of one constitutional 
value-no sexual orientation discrimination-could not 
eviscerate another constitutional value-freedom of religion.5 
* University Counsel & Assistant Professor of Government, Christopher Newport 
University. B.A. Hanover College (1986); M.A, University of Melbourne (1988); J.D., 
University of Virginia (1990). Mr. Thro writes in his personal capacity and his views do 
not represent the views of the Attorney General of Virginia. 
1. ALBIE SACHS, THE STRANGE ALCHEMY OF LIFE AND LAW 2:39 (2009). 
2. See Minister of Home Affairs u. Fourie 2006 (9) SA 521 (CC). 
:3. SACHS, supra note 1, at 2:39. 
4. /d. 
5. ld. at 240. 
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In other words, the opinion of the Court must affirm both 
equality and freedom. 
Although the South African Constitution6 is fundamentally 
different from the United States Constitution and although the 
South African Constitutional Court's analytical approach is 
substantially different from that of the Supreme Court, 7 
.Justice Sachs' wisdom is equally applicable to America." 
Constitutional law is not a zero sum game. The affirmation of 
one constitutional value does not require the subordination or 
denial of another constitutional value. Tt is possible to have a 
strong national government and maintain the sovereignty of 
the states9 lt is possible to have a vigorous and energetic 
president whik respecting the clear prerogatives of both 
Congress and the judiciary. 10 Most significantly, it is possible 
to have equality without sacrificing freedom. Indeed, ensuring 
the affirmation of both equality and freedom is the "heart of the 
constitutional enterprise." 11 
As our nation confronts demands for state recognition of 
same-sex marriage, 12 our jurists and policymakers must heed 
6. When the white minority in South Africa voluntarily snrrPrtrlererl it:s control 
of thl' government to hlack majority in the early 1990\:;, o.ll segments of the multi-racial 
society negotiated u Constitution. For a discussion of thosP negutintions . .c:re LJ. 
l{AUTENBACH & E.F.J. MALHERBIE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 17-:.n (1th (\il. ~00·1); ZIYAI) 
MOTAL.A & CYRIL RAMAPHOSA, CO:-.JRTTTUT10~AL LAW: ANALYSIS & C1\SES 1-11 (2002). 
7. See MARKS. KENDE, CO~STJTUTIONAL HWH'l'S IN TWO WORLDS: SOUTH AFRIC..\ 
AND Tm~ UI\TTI<:D STATE~ 8--10 (2009) (describing how the South Afriean Constitutional 
Court's approach to constitutional interpretation differs from that of the Supreme 
Court of thP Unib~rl Stab:s). 
8. This docs not mean t.haL the Supreme Court should adopt or (:ven rply on the 
law of anoth(:r nation. Ratht>r, it simply means that Justice Sachs offers a wise insight. 
J\,:, explained elscwhure, thu Amet·iean Constitution and our !eg:ll s_yst.em arf' uniqllL'. 
See William E. Thro, AmPrican Rxception.alism: Some 71wughts on Sanchez·llmnas v. 
Oregon, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 219 (2007). 
9. ThP Constitution "split. the a torn of sowreignty" hy "l'stahlishing two orders of 
government, L'aeh with its own direct. n•lationship, its own privity, it.s own set of 
mutual rights and obligations to the pcoplu who sustain iL and an: ~overned by it." U.S. 
Term Limits v. Thornton, fil-1 U.S. 77!). H:$H (Hm5) (Kennedy, ,_1., concurring). This 
division of soverei~nty hetween the states and the national {;ovvrnmcnt "i,s a dcrining 
f!'ature of our nation's eonstitutional hhwprint." Fed. Mar. Comrn'n v. S.C. State Ports 
Auth .. fi:1fl U.S. 71:~, 751 (2002). 
10. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Aceountin!-!: Own.;ight Bd., 1:~0 S. Ct. :n:l,":l, 
:lJGfi-57 (20 1 0). 
11. William K Thro & Charle}i ,J. l{u,;:;o, ;\ Serio118 Se/.l)(lc;/~ for Freedom.: The 
lmplicalion8 of Christian Legal Society v. M arti.nez, 2fi 1 EllLIC. L. Rl·~l'. 17::), 47;~ (20 10). 
12. Whilt' it is dangerous t.o asSlliDP that the pn•.sent direction of puhlic opinion 
will eonlinue. it seems likely that many states (!VPntually will hav(> some sort of stat.e 
recognition of sHmL'-sex unionR, hut this n'eognition might not. inclu(k• tlw tt:"nn 
''marriage." It seems certain that many people of faith-whether tlwy are Christian, 
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Justice Sachs' warning-do not divide the constitutional 
community. 13 Regardless of whether government recognizes 
same-sex relationships and regardless of whether government 
describes that recognition as "marriage," 14 the state must treat 
gays and lesbians as full and equal members of society. 15 Our 
Constitution does not tolerate classes among its citizens. 16 
Statutes that criminalize certain sexual acts 17 must apply with 
equal force to both homosexuals and heterosexuals. 18 Similarly, 
even if every state eventually recognizes same-sex marriage, 
government may not prescribe what is orthodox in politics 19 or 
punish religious belie£.2° Government must not persecute 
people of faith21 or undermine private charities.22 The 
Jew, or Muslim-will continue to reject the idea that a same-sex union is equivalent to 
their faith's definition of marriage. 
1 :l. SACHS, supra note 1, at 239. 
11. Government may choose to defuse some of the objections to same-sex 
marriage hy recognizing same-sex "civil unions" hut reserving "marriage" for opposite 
sex coupkes. Assuming that the requirements for entering or leaving a civil union are 
identical to those for marriage and assuming that the legal benefits are identical, the 
only difference between marriage and civil unions would he semantic and symbolic. In 
many contexts, particularly religious contexts, issues of semantics and symbols are 
enormously important. 
15. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 6il1-il6 (1996). 
16. /d. at 62::\. See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 16::\ U.S. 5il7, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J. 
dissenting). 
17. At first blush, Lawrence v. Texas, 5:39 U.S. 558 (2003), appears to preclude 
government from ever criminalizing oral or anal sex. Yet, upon closer examination, a 
more complex picture emerges. Despite its use of seemingly sweeping language, the 
holding in Lawrence is actually "a narrow as-applied holding." Utah v. Holm, 137 !'.3d 
736, 712-13 (Utah 2006). Properly understood, Lawrence forbids any governmental 
"intrusion upon a person's liberty interest when that interest is exercised in the form of 
private, consensual sexual conduct between adults." Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.K2d 367, 
370 (Va. 2005). In particular, Lawrence "explained that the liberty interest at issue was 
not a fundamental right to engage in certain conduct hut was the right to enter and 
maintain a personal relationship without governmental interference." !d. at :369 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). While Lawrence established "a greater respect 
than previously existed in the law for the right of consenting adults to engage in 
private sexual conduct," Lofton v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children & Family Servs., il58 F.3d 
801, 815-16 (11th Cir. 2001), it has no impact on the ability of the states to prosecute 
sexual conduct between an adult and a minor, McDonald v. Va., 615 S.K2d 918, 922 
(Va. 2007); U.S. v. Bach, 100 F.3d 622, 628-29 (8th Cir. 2005), or sexual conduct that 
occurs in public, Singson v. Va., 621 S.K2d 682, 688-9:3 (Va. App. 2005); Tjan v. Va., 
621 S.E.2d 669, 672-7G (Va. App. 2005) (both holding that the Commonwealth may 
criminalizc sexual conduct that occurs in public). 
18. Lawrence, 5:39 U.S. at 579-8::\ (O'Connor, J. concurring). 
19. W.Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, :l19 U.S. 624, 612 (1913). 
20. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005). 
21. See Douglas W. Kmiec, Same Sex Marria&e and the Coming 
Antidiscrimination Campai&ns A&ainst Religion, in SAME-SEX MARRTACE AND 
RELI(;IOUS LIBERTY 10:l (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. l'icarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell 
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affirmation of equality must not result in the subordination of 
freedom and vice versa. Rather, the Constitution must affirm 
both equality and freedom. 23 
Affirming both equality and freedom IS particularly 
challenging in the context of public education. Public 
education, whether in the context of K-12 or higher education, 
brings together people of different races, generations, socio-
economic classes, faiths, and values. Indeed, public education 
arguably is the most diverse segment of American society. 
Moreover, the young frequently express themselves with 
rhetoric that is rough rather than refined and in a manner that 
is dramatic instead of dignified. Escalation is all too common 
and too easy. In this environment, potential for conflict and 
misunderstanding is exponentially greater than in society. Yet, 
gays and lesbians justifiably demand that government schools 
and universities treat them with dignity and equality. 
Similarly, people of faith and political dissenters 
understandably demand that their freedoms do not disappear 
at the schoolhouse gate.24 
This article seeks to ensure public education does not 
"wander away from the heart of the constitutional enterprise" 
as our nation grapples with same-sex marriage.25 Its purpose is 
to prevent public education from favoring equality over 
freedom, or vice versa. It aims to promote the affirmation of 
equality for homosexuals and freedom for those who disagree 
with same-sex marriage. While a discussion of all the possible 
constitutional issues related to the consequences of state 
recognition of same-sex unions in public education contexts 
would be a monumental work and well beyond the scope of this 
article and this symposium, it is possible to articulate some 
Wilson, eds., 2008). 
22. See Jonathon Turley, An Unholy Union: Same-Sex Marriage and the Use of 
Governmental Programs to Penalize Reli!{ious Groups with Unpopular Practices, in 
SAME-SEX MAIUHAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 59 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R 
Picarello, Jr., & Robin Fretwell Wilson, eds., 2008). 
2:l. The affirmation of freedom is important to both advocates of same-sex 
marriage and those who disagree with the transformation of a vital societal institution. 
"Religious groups and gay rights groups share common ground in the need for freedom 
of association. Both are vulnerable (in different parts of the country) to the hostile 
reactions of university administrators and fellow students." Drief of the Petitioner at 
58, Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (No. 08-1:371). 
21. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 39:l U.S. 50:l, 506 (1969). 
25. SACHS, supra note 1, at 2:39. 
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general principles.26 Those general principles will guide jurists, 
policy-makers, and educational administrators. 
This article has three parts. The first part discusses the 
constitutional value of equality in the context of same-sex 
marriage. Although government may not engage in irrational 
sexual orientation discrimination, the national Constitution 
does not require recognition of same-sex marriage. Rather, the 
states, in the exercise of their sovereignty, may choose to 
establish same-sex marriage, but are not required to recognize 
same-sex marriages performed in other states. The second part 
exammes the constitutional value of freedom and its 
significance for those who have political or theological 
objections to state recognition of same-sex unions. These rights 
include the freedom of speech, including the freedom of 
association, the freedom of parents to direct the upbringing of 
their children, and the freedom of religion. The third part 
explains how public education may affirm both the equality of 
homosexuals and the freedom of those who oppose same-sex 
marriage. Specifically, public schools and universities must 
refrain from sexual orientation discrimination, must respect 
the right of faculty to express positions on same sex-marriage, 
and must allow students, whether individually or in groups, to 
advocate on issues related to same-sex marriage. In some 
instances, student groups may have greater rights under the 
state constitutions or state law. 
II. EQUALITY 
A. Government May Not Engage in Irrational Sexual 
Orientation Discrimination 
The Equal Protection Clause,27 which applies to ''persons, 
not groups,"2x is "essentially a direction that all persons 
26. Constitutional problems in public education-like constitutional problems in 
other areas-are always context specific. A subtle change in policy or circumstances 
may create or alleviate constitutional problems. 
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
28. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). See also City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 188 U.S. 469,494 (1989); Wygantv. Jackson Bd. ofEduc., 
476 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1986). Indeed, the "rights created by the first section of the 
Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights 
established are Pl'rsonal rights." Shelley v. Kraemer, 331 U.S. 1, 22 (1948). 
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similarly situated ... be treated alike."29 If a program treats 
everyone equally, there is no equal protection violation.30 The 
"general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will 
be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest."31 At the same 
time, this general rule gives way in those rare instances when 
statutes infringe upon fundamental constitutional rights or 
utilize "suspect" or "quasi -suspect" classifications. 32 Because 
racial classifications "are by their very nature odious to a free 
people whose institutions are founded on the doctrine of 
equality"33 and "call for the most exacting judicial 
examination,"34 they are, regardless of their purpose,35 
"constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further 
compelling governmental interests."36 Similarly, classifications 
based on gender are subject to "quasi-strict scrutiny" and are 
valid only if the classifications (1) serve important 
governmental objectives; and (2) substantially relate to the 
achievement of those objectives.37 In contrast, classifications 
based upon age, 3x disability,39 income,40 or sexual orientation41 
receive rational basis scrutiny. The law or policy is 
constitutional unless it "lacks a rational relationship to 
legitimate state interests."42 
29. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 178 U.S. 1:l2, 1:l9 (1985). 
30. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996). 
31. Cleburne. 473 U.S. at 440; Schweiker v. Wilson, 150 U.S. 221, 2:m (1981). 
32. Cleburne, 47:l U.S. at 110-41; Graham v. Richardson, 10:i U.S. :l65 (1971); 
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
33. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 6:l0, 613 (1993). 
34. Bakke v. Bd. of Regl,nts of the Univ. of Cal., 1:l8 U.S. 265. 291 (1978). 
35. Indeed, the Court has "insisted on strict scrutiny in every context, even f(Jr so-
called 'benign' racial classifications, such as race-conscious university admissions 
policies, race-based preferences in government contracts, and race-based districting 
intended to improve minority n'presentation." .Johnson v. Cal., 51:! U.S. 49~1. 505 
(2005) (citations omitted). 
36. Grutter v. Bollingl,r, 539 U.S. il06, :l26 (2003) (citations omitted). 
37. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 158 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Craig v. Boren. 
129 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
38. Vance v. Bradley, 110 U.S. 9:i, 97 (1979). 
39. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 173 U.S. 1:l2, 1:l9-10 (1985). 
40. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriqtwz, 411 U.S. 1, 18-21 (197:l). 
41. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 62:i (1996). 
42. !d. at 632. 
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B. The National Constitution Does Not Require Recognition of 
Same-Sex Marriage 
While the Constitution prohibits irrational sexual 
orientation discrimination, this does not mean that the 
Constitution requires same-sex marriage.43 If the state chooses 
to recognize marriage-and there is no constitutional 
obligation for the state to do so44-then the state may restrict 
marriage to opposite couples.45 Quite simply, it is rational for 
the state to adopt the definition of marriage that has 
dominated human culture for the past four millennia.46 
Moreover, if the protections of the Due Process Clause are 
limited to "those fundamental rights and liberties which are 
objectively, deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition, 
and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither 
liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed,"47 then 
the fundamental right to marry4x does not encompass same-sex 
marriage.49 
4C1. nut see Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 701 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) 
(holding that, if the states recogni?-e traditional marriage, the national Constitution 
requires the states to recognize same-sex marriage), stay denied, 702 F. Supp. 2d 11 :32 
(N.D. Cal. 201 0). For the reasons stated in the monumental opening brief of the 
Defendant-Intervenors-Appellees, I believe it is doubtful that tbe reasoning and logic of 
Perry will survive appldlate review. See Brief of Defendant-Intervenor-Appellees at 1:l-
11:1, Perry v. Schwarzenl~gger, No. 10-16966 (9th Cir. 2010). 
44. A state "has absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the 
marriage relation betwm~n its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it 
may be dissolved." Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 711, 734-:35 (1878). See also Sosna v. 
Iowa, 419 U.S. 39:3, 101 (1975). Thus, "a Statl' may legitimately say that no one can 
marry his or her sibling, that no one can marry who is not at least 14 years old, that no 
one can marry without first passing an examination for venereal disease, or that no one 
can marry who has a living husband or wife." Zablocki v. Redhail, 1:-31 U.S. :-371, :-392 
(1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
45. See Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 155 F.3d 859, 867-68 (8th Cir. 2006). 
Moreover, in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), the Supreme Court dismissed an 
appeal of Minnesota's refusal to grant marriage license to same sex couple for lack of a 
substantial fl,deral question. Unlike a denial of certiorari, a dismissal of an appeal for 
lack of a substantial federal question is a decision on the merits. See Mandel v. 
Bradley, 1il2 U.S. 17a, 176 (1977) (per curiam). 
46. nruning, 455 F.:1d at 867-68. See also Brief of Defendant-Intervenor-
Appellees at 75-11:1, Perry v. Schwar?-enegger, No. 10-16966 (9th Cir. 2010). 
47. Washington v. Glucksberg 521 U.S. 702, 720-22 (1997). See also Dist. 
Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2:l22 (2009) (reiterating the Glucksber!J 
standard). cr. McDonald V. City of Chi., 1 :-lo S. Ct. 3020, :l0c14-36 (2010) (adopting 
similar standard for determining when a provision of the Bill of Rights is incorporated 
against the States). 
48. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
49. See Brief of Defendant-Intervenor-Appellees at 4 7-69, Perry v. 
Schwarzeneggcr, No. 10-16966 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining why the right to marry a 
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C. Establishment of Same-Sex Marriage is Within the States' 
Sovereign Sphere 
1. Exercising its sovereignty, a state may choose to establish 
same-sex marriage 
"An integral component of that 'residuary and inviolable 
sovereignty' retained by the States,"50 is control over domestic 
relations. 51 "Family relations are a traditional area of state 
concern,"52 and "domestic relations are preeminently matters of 
state law."53 "The whole subject of the domestic relations of 
husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the 
states and not to the laws of the United States."54 Thus, the 
states, in the exercise of their sovereignty, 55 may choose to 
establish same-sex marriage56 or may decline to do so. 57 
Unfortunately, the judiciary frequently interferes with this 
sovereign choice. Indeed, of the five states that allow same-sex 
marnage, only New Hampshire did so without judicial 
person of the same sex is not firmly rooted in the nation's history). 
50. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 5:l5 U.S. 71:l, 751-52 (2002). 
51. See I£lk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 512 U.S. 1, 12-1:l (2004). 
52. Moore v. Sims, 112 U.S. 115, 1:35 (1979). 
5:3. Mansell v. Mansell, 190 U.S. 581, 587 (1989). 
54. Rose v. Hose, 181 U.S. 619, 625 (1987). 
55. Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the thirteen states effectively were 
thirteen sovereign nations. See Blatchford v. Native Viii. of Noatak. 501 U.S. 775. 779 
(1991). 
56. Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, and New Hampshire have 
established same-sex marriage. 
57. Exercising their sovereignty, the people of twenty-nine states have rejected 
same-sex marriage. See ALA. CON ST. art. I, § :36.0:3; ALASKA CON ST. art. 1, § 25; Arm~. 
CONST. art. XXX,§ 1; AI1K. CONS'!'. amend. 83, §§ 1-:i; CAL. CONS'!'. art. I,§ 7.5; COLO. 
CONST. art. II, § 31; FIA CON ST. art. I § 27; GA. CONS'!'. art. I, § IV. ,[ i; IDAHO CON ST. 
art. III,§ 28; KAN. CONS'!'. art. XV,§ 16; KY. CONS'!'.§ 2:lila; LA. CONS'!'. art. XII,§ 15; 
MICH. CONS'l'. art. I, § 25; MISS. CONS'!'. art. XIV, § 26ila; Mo. CONS'!'. art. I, § 33; MONT. 
CONS'!'. art. XIII,§ 7; NEB. CONST. art. I,§ 29; NEV. CONS'!'. art. I,§ 21; N.D. CONST. rt. 
X, § 28; OHIO CON ST. art. XV, § 11; OKLA. CONS'!'. art. ll, § :l5; OiL CON ST. art. XV, § 5a; 
S.C. CONST. art. XVII,§ 15; S.D. CONST. art. XXI,§ 9; TENN. CONS'!'. art. XI,§ 18; TEX. 
CONST. art. I, § :32; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29; VA. CONS'!'. art. I. § Hi-a; Wrs. CONST. art. 
XIII, § 1:i. 
Moreover, several states have enacted statutes n,affirming the traditional 
view of marriage. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (201 0); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572-1. 
572-:3 (2010); 750 ILL. COM!'. STAT. 5/212 (2010); lNil. COilE § :31-11-1-1 (2010); ME. 
REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 701.5 (2011); MD. CODE, FAM. LAW§ 2-2()1 (LexisNexis 2011); 
MINN. STAT.§ 517.01 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 51-1.2 (2010); 2:l l'A. CONS. STAT.§ 
1704 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 through .020 (2011); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-
60:3 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 20-1-101 (2010). See also 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2011); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 10-1-1 through 10-1-7 (201 0); IU. GEN. LAWS§§ 15-1-1 through 15-1-5 (2010). 
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intervention. ss In Vermont, the judiciary mandated recognition 
of same-sex unions, 59 and the legislature later decided to 
recognize same-sex marriage.60 In Connecticut,61 Iowa,62 and 
Massachusetts,63 the judiciary interpreted the state 
constitution as requiring same-sex marriage. 64 
Such judicial intervention into the state's sovereign choice 
is problematic. Because an expansive judicial interpretation 
endures until the people amend the state constitution,65 courts 
"must never forget that it is a constitution we are 
expounding."66 Constitutions are "intended to endure for ages 
to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises 
of human affairs."67 Constitutions "are not ephemeral 
enactments, designed to meet passing occasions . . . . The 
future is their care and provision for events of good and bad 
tendencies of which no prophecy can be made."68 When 
confronting a challenge, judges must recognize that they are 
not "a bevy of Platonic Guardians"69 as the "myth of the legal 
profession's omnicompetence ... was exploded long ago."70 
"There was a time when [the judiciary] presumed to make such 
binding judgments for society, under the guise of interpreting 
58. Sec N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 457:1 (2011) et seq. 
59. See Baker v. Vermont, 711 A.2d 844 (Vt. 1999). 
60. See 2009 VT. ACTS & RESOLVES 3. 
61. See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 107 (Conn. 2008). 
62. See Varnum v. Brien, 76:3 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
63. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Health, 798 N.E.2d 911 (Mass. 2003). 
64. But see Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 l'.:ld 151 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), 
review denied sub nom, Standhart v. MCSC, No. CV-O:l-0122-PR, 2001 Ariz. LEXIS 
62 (Ariz. May 25, 20(11); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2005); Conaway v. Deane, 9:32 A.2d 219 (Md. 2007); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 
(Minn. 1971) (rejecting the argument that the state constitution requires same-sex 
marriage); Hernandez v. llobles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); Andersen v. King County, 
138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006). See also Dean v. D.C., 65il A.2d :l07 (D.C. 1995) (per 
curiam). 
65. This is exactly what happened in California. The Supreme Court of California 
held that the California Constitution required same-sex marriage. See In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d 381 (Cal. 2008). The people then amended their constitution to prohibit 
same-sex marriage. Sec Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5. Of course, a federal judge subsequently 
held that the constitutional amendment violated the federal Constitution. See Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 701 F. Supp. 2d at 921, 991-1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
66. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 107 (1819). 
67. Id. at 415. 
68. Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349, :373 (1910). 
69. Griswold v. Connecticut, :l81 U.S. 479, 51:3 (1965) (Black, ,J., dissenting). 
70. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of gduc. Sch. Dist. No. 205, 111 F.3d 528, 
536 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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the Due Process Clause. We should not seek to reclaim that 
ground for judicial supremacy ... "71 Absent a clear violation of 
the constitutional text and structure, jurists should uphold 
even "uncommonly silly" laws and policies.72 
In sum, if a state is going to adopt same-sex marriage, the 
decision should come from the legislature or from a popularly 
enacted amendment to the state constitution. The 
transformation of marriage should not come from the judiciary 
suddenly declaring that the meaning of the state constitution 
has "evolved."73 
2. A state may decline to recognize a same-sex marriage 
performed in another state 
A state may decline to 
performed in another state. 
Faith and Credit Clause was: 
. . 
recogmze a same-sex marnage 
The "very purpose" of the Full 
to alter the status of the several states as independent foreign 
sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under 
the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to 
make them integral parts of a single nation throughout which 
a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of 
right, irrespective of the state of its origin. 74 
Yet, "the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a 
State to apply another State's law in violation of its own 
legitimate public policy."75 "Nor is there any authority which 
lends support to the view that the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
compels the courts of one state to subordinate the local policy of 
that state, as respects its domiciliaries, to the statutes of any 
other state."76 Indeed, a state is not compelled to "[s]ubstitute 
the statutes of other States for its own statutes dealing with a 
subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate."77 
"Neither the Due Process Clause nor Full Faith and Credit 
71. United Haulers v. Oneida Harkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth .. 127 S. Ct. 
1786, 1798 (2007) (citation omitted). 
72. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
7:3. None of the state constitutions has an explicit provision h'11arantecing same-
sex marriage. In the absence of such explicit provisions, it is difficult to argue that the 
state constitution's text mandates recognition of same-sex marriage. 
71. Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935). 
75. Nevada v. Hall. 110 U.S. 110, 122 (1979). 
76. Williams v. North Carolina, :31 7 U.S. 287, 296 (1912). 
77. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 188. ·19:3-91 (2003). 
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Clause requires [a state] 'to substitute for its own [laws], 
applicable to persons and events within it, the conflicting 
statute of another state."'78 If the public policy exception allows 
a state to refuse to recognize the sovereign immunity of 
another state, 79 then surely a state may refuse a marriage 
performed in another state that is contrary to the state's 
fundamental law. 
Ill. FREEDOM 
As explained above, the issue of whether to have same-sex 
marriage ultimately is a decision for each state. Yet, no matter 
what a state decides with respect to same-sex marriage, those 
who agree or disagree with that decision retain certain 
freedoms. 
A. Freedom of Speech 
Individuals who disagree with the state on same-sex 
marriage have the right to express their disagreement. 80 "The 
proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we 
protect the freedom to express 'the thought that we hate.'"81 
"The First Amendment's guarantee of free speech does not 
extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc 
balancing of relative social costs and benefits,"82 but also 
"embraces such a heated exchange of views, even (perhaps 
especially) when they concern sensitive topics like race, where 
the risk of conflict and insult is high."83 "While the law is free 
to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it 
is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than 
78. Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822-23 (1985). 
79. Srr Hyatt, 588 U.S. at -196-98. 
80. Although some may object to a pro- or anti-same-sex marriage message, the 
Court has consistently rejected attempts to han speech that is offensive to the 
audience. See U.S. v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 80:l, 814-816 (2000); R.A.V. v. St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 877, 882 (1992); Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 
v. Pico. 457 U.S. 85:l, 871-872 (1982) (plurality opinion); Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 898 U.S. 508, 508-09 (1969). 
81. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 180 S. Ct 2971, 8000 (2010) (Alito, J., 
joined hy Roberts, C.J., Scalia, & Thomas JJ., dissenting) (quoting U.S. v. Schwimmer, 
279 U.S. 6-1-1,65-1-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
82. UnitPd StatPs v. StPvens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010). 
sa. ]{odriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coli. Dist., 605 F.ad 70:3, 708 (9th Cir. 
2010). See also R.A. V., 505 U.S. at :l91. 
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promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored 
one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the 
governmenL."s4 "[A]s is true of all expressions of First 
Amendment freedoms, the courts may not interfere on the 
ground that they view a particular expression as unwise or 
irrational."x5 Indeed, "it is axiomatic that the government may 
nol silence speech because the ideas it promotes are thought to 
he offcnsivc."X6 
Moreover, "[a]n individual's freedom to speak, to worship, 
and to petition the governmrmt for the redress of grievances 
could not be vigorously protected from interference by the Stale 
unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward 
those ends were not also guaranteed."X7 "This right is crucial in 
preventing the majority from imposing its views on groups that 
would rather express other, perhaps unpopular, idcas."xx "If the 
government were free to restrict individuals' ability lo join 
together and speak, it could essentially silence views that the 
First Amendment is intended to protect."x9 This freedom of 
association "is not reserved for advocacy groups. But to come 
within its ambit, a group must engage in some form of 
expression, whether it be public or private."90 
B. Parental Rights 
The Constitution protects "the fundamental right of parents 
to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of 
their childrcn."91 "The child is not the mere creature of the 
state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the 
right, coupled with the high dLtty, to recognize and prepare him 
for additional obligations."92 Since "the custody, care and 
8-'1. Hurley v. Iri~h-Am. Gay, Lesbiau & Bisexual Grp. of Bus .. 515 L!.!-'. :};)7, S79 
(1995). 
8G. Democratic Part.y of the U.S. v. Wiscon::;in ex rei. LaFollette, ·150 U.[-;. 107. 12·1 
(I 9H2). 
8G. Uodriuw:z. 603 J<'.Jd at 708. See also Brandenburg v. Ohio, :195 U.S. ·1·H, .-HH-
48, (HJGB); Saxe v. State Cull. Area Seh. Dist., 240 F.:3d 200. 204 (:1d Cir. 2001 ): 
Dt•Ang-elis v. F:l Pa:;o Mun. Polict~ Offil't>r::o; As<J'n, 51 F.:1d !191, 5~)()-...97 (5th Cir. 19!-};)). 
H7. Hohert.s v. U.S. ,Ja.vct:PH. 46H lJ.S. WJ$1, f)22 (1 9H1). 
88. Boy .SeouLs of America v. Dalt\ 5:.\0 U.S. 6·10, 617 -rlH (2000). 
8~J. Humsfeld v. Forum for Acarlt>mic & lnst'l Rights, S17 U.S. 17. Ol:l (200()). 
90. /Jale. 530 lJ.S. at GGO. 
91. Troxel v. Cnmvillc. 5:10 U.S. 57,(}() (~000). 
92. Pierce v. Soc'y of t.hL' Sisters. 2fiK L .S. G 10. G:-:!5 (192;)). 
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nurture of the child reside first in the parents,"93 parents may 
send their children to private schools,94 or educate the children 
at home.95 
C. Freedom of Religion 
To the extent that one's religious belief compels one to favor 
or oppose same sex-marnage, the Constitution absolutely 
protects that belie£.96 
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be 
neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. 
It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no 
religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or 
religious theory against another or even against the militant 
opposite. 97 
"The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed 
against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as 
such."9x The Constitution "requires government respect for, 
and noninterference with, the religious beliefs and practices of 
our Nation's people."99 "No person can be punished for 
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for 
church attendance or nonattendance." 100 "Government may 
neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief, nor penalize 
or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold 
religious views abhorrent to the authorities nor employ the 
taxing power to inhibit the dissemination of particular religious 
93. Prince v. Massachusetts, ::321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
91. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 531-35. 
95. See Peterson v. Minidoka Sch. Dist. No. ::331, 118 F.:ld 1351, 1::357 (9th Cir. 
1997) (First Amendment right of free exercise includes right to home school a child); 
Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1043 (8th Cir. 1988) (acknowledging the right to 
home school a child, but upholding state regulation of that right). To date, more than 
thirty states have enacted statutes that allow parents to home school their children. In 
the remainder of states, home schooling is legal pursuant to a variety of types of 
regulations. 
96. Feldblum suggests that Court should treat religious claims "as belief liberty 
interests under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
rather than as free exercise claims under the First Amendment." Chai R. Feldblum, 
Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in SAMl,-SEX MARRTAC~E AND RELlGlOUS 
LIBEHTY 123, 125 (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., & Robin Fretwell 
Wilson, eels., 2008). 
97. Epperson v. Ark., ::39::3 U.S. 97, 10:Hl4 (1968). 
98. Sherbert v. Verner, ::371 U.S. 398, 402-03 (196::3). 
99. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 541 U.S. 709, 719 (2005). 
100. Everson v. Bel. of Educ., :i:iO U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). 
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views." 101 Indeed, "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, 
logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to 
merit First Amendment protection." 102 Thus, religious groups 
may profess any beliefs they wish and may exclude those who 
disagree with their beliefs. 103 Insofar as the state is not 
required "to be oblivious to impositions that legitimate 
exercises of state power may place on religious belief and 
practice," 104 the government may treat religious organizations 
more favorably than non-religious groups without violating the 
Establishment Clause. 105 
While belief is absolutely protected, "the right of free 
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to 
comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on 
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that 
his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."' 106 Thus, "a law that is 
neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a 
compelling governmental interest even [if] the law has the 
incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice." 107 
In determining whether a law is neutral and generally 
applicable, judges must ask if "the object of the law is to 
infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious 
motivation" 108 and if the law "in a selective manner impose 
burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belie£." 109 
"Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and 
101. Sherbert. :374 U.S. at 108. 
102. Thomas v. l{eview Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 711 (19H1). 
10:1. See generally Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of ,Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 11-\3 U.S. :!27, 3:34-40 (1987). 
104. Ed. ofEduc. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,705 (1991). 
105. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 541 U.S. 709, 719-21 (2005) (Religious Land Usl' and 
Institutionalized Persons Act, which requires preferential treatment for religion, dm's 
not violate the Establishment Clause). See also Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 189 U.S. 1, 
18 n.8 (1989) ("[Wje in no way suggest that all benefits confl,rred cxclusivl,ly upon 
religious groups or upon individuals on account of their religious beliefs an• forbiddcn 
by thl' Establishment Clause unless they are mandated by thc Free Excrcisl' Clause."): 
Amos, 11-\3 U.S. at :3:35 (recognizing that the govcrnml,nt may sometiml'S accommodate 
religious practices without violating the Establishment Clause). 
106. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 191 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). See also U.S. v. Lee. 155 U.S. 
252, 26:) n.:) (1982) (Stevens, J .. concurring). The Court first enunciated this principle 
in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 115 (1878) (rejecting a Free Exercise Clause 
challenge to a federal polygamy statute). 
107. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 5:31 
(1998). 
108. /d. at 5:3:1. 
109. ld. at 513. 
2] HEART OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE 585 
failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the 
other has not been satisfied." 110 
IV. AFFIRMING BOTH EQUALITY AND FREEDOM IN PUBLIC 
EDUCATION 
Although all controversial political issues are problematic 
for public education, 111 the issue of same-sex marriage goes far 
beyond objections to the curricular treatment of the issue. 112 In 
many ways, the debate over same-sex marriage, like all 
debates over gay rights, is a "clash between those who believe 
that homosexual conduct is immoral and those who believe that 
it is a natural and morally unobjectionable manifestation of 
human sexuality." 113 As Eugene Volokh observed, one goal of 
the gay rights movement is "delegitimizing and legally 
punishing private behavior that discriminates against or 
condemns homosexuals." 114 Kmiec believes, "apparently one of 
the main aspirations of the homosexual movement is 
retaliation against the defenders of traditional marriage."115 As 
the Constitution allows the government to punish private 
religious organizations that advocate racist views, 116 
government logically could punish those who oppose same-sex 
marriage or regard homosexual conduct as sinful. 117 In an 
environment where some want not only to affirm equality, but 
110. /d.at531. 
111. See David Schimmel symposium piece. 
112. For a discussion of curricular objections, see generally Charles J. Russo, The 
Child is Not the Mere Creature of The State: Controversy over Teaching About Same-Sex 
Marriage in Public Schools, 2:32 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2008); Charles J. Russo & William E. 
Thro, Curricular Control and Parental Rights: Balancing the Rights of Educators and 
Parents in American Public Schools, 12 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. L. & Enuc. 91 (2007). 
113. Michael McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1, 1::3~11 (2000). See also l<'eldhlum, supra note 96, at 1::J:l~:l4 (discussing McConnell). 
11 !J. Eugene Volokoh, Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1155, 11 78 (2005). 
115. Kmiec, supra note 21, at 104. Kmiec also notes that some gay rights advocates 
have openly declared their intent to discredit and marginalize traditional religious 
practices. !d. (quoting Larry W. Shackle, Parading Ourselves: Freedom of Speech at the 
Feast of St. l'atrich, 73 B.U. L. REV. 791, 792 (1993)). 
116. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 59:5~96 (1983) (denying 
tax-exempt status to private religiously affiliated university that espoused racist 
beliefs). 
117. Kmiec, supra note 21, at 104~05. See also William E. Thro & Charles J. 
Russo, A Serious Setbach for Freedom: The Implications of Christian Legal Soc'y v. 
Martinez, 261 Enuc. LAW REP. !J7a (2010). 
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also to deny freedom to those who disagree, the potential for 
explosive confrontation is at its highest. 11 ~ Despite the volatile 
nature of the situation, the Constitution requires that public 
education affirm both equality and freedom. 119 
A. Public Education Must Not Engage in Sexual Orientation 
Discrimination 
Regardless of whether a particular state recognizes same-
sex marriage, government, including institutions of public 
education, must refrain from irrational sexual orientation 
discrimination against employees and students. 120 Government 
may not deny employment or the ability to study simply 
because of one's sexual orientation. Similarly, the state may 
not deny opportunities because an individual is involved in a 
same-sex marriage or advocates for or against same-sex 
marriage. To the extent that harassment based on sexual 
orientation is discrimination based on sex, 121 educational 
institutions must respond effectively to harassment against 
students 122 and teachers. 123 Refraining from discrimination 
and responding to harassment, which is a form of 
discrimination, represents an affirmation of equality. 124 
B. Teachers May Express Their Positions on Same-Sex 
Marriage 
When speaking outside of the classroom or in their personal 
capacities, teachers and professors have the right to express 
their approval or disapproval of same sex-marriage. 125 Public 
118. See Charles ,J. ]{us so symposium piece. 
119. See Alii Fetter-Harrott symposium piece. 
120. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 6:3:1-:3-1 (199G). 
121. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 52:l U.S. 75, 71-l-82 (1998) 
(holding that Title Vll prohibits same-sex sexual harassment). 
122. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of l~duc., 52() U.S. ()29, 650-52 (1999) (Title IX 
liability for sexual harassment of student by another student); GeiJSer v. Lago Vista 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 521 U.S. 276,288-92 (1998) (Title IX liability for sexual harassment 
of student by faculty member). 
12:l. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-09 (1998); Burlington 
Indus. v. Ellerth, 521 U.S. 712, 751-65(1998). 
121. These steps are the minimum that an educational institution can and must 
do. Of course, the institution may do more to affirm equality, but doing more may well 
subordinate freedom. 
125. However, this right has nothing to do with a claim of individual acadl'mic 
freedom. See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 21() F.:ld 101, 115 (lith Cir. 2000) (en bane). Indeed. 
"to the extent the Constitution recognizes any right of 'academic freedom' above and 
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employees, including public school teachers and faculty 
members at state universities, retain broad First Amendment 
rights. 126 While the Court recently held that public employees 
lack First Amendment rights when speaking in their official 
capacities, 127 the Court has "made clear that public employees 
do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of 
their employment." 12X Thus, while the administration may 
require that the faculty member adhere to the institutional 
position concerning same-sex marriage when in the classroom 
or while representing the school, it may not prevent the faculty 
member from criticizing or endorsing same-sex marriage. 
C. Students, As Individuals or In Groups, May Express Their 
Positions on Same-Sex Marriage 
Subject to restrictions that reflect the unique nature of the 
school environment, students may express their approval or 
disagreement with same-sex marriage. 129 "Intellectual 
advancement has traditionally progressed through discord and 
dissent, as a diversity of views ensures that ideas survive 
because they are correct, not because they are popular." 130 
"Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to 
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and 
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and 
die." 131 "Without the right to stand against society's most 
strongly-held convictions, the marketplace of ideas would 
decline into a boutique of the banal, as the urge to censor is 
greatest where debate is most disquieting and orthodoxy most 
entrenched." 132 
beyond the First Amendment rights to which every citizen is entitled, the right inheres 
in the University, not in individual professors." Id. at 410. 
126. United States v. Nat'! Treasury Emps. Union, 51:3 U.S. 151 (1995); Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 1:38 (198:3); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., :391 U.S. 56:3 (1968). 
127. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 517 U.S. 410, 421-22 (2006). 
128. ld. at 117. 
129. Morse v. FredL,rick, 551 U.S. :393, 103-10 (2007). See also id. at 422-25 (Alito, 
J., joined by Kenm,dy, .J., concurring) (emphasizing the limited ability of government to 
control student speech). 
1:10. Rodriguez v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coli. Dist., 605 F.:3d 70:3, 708 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
131. Keyishian v. Bel. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 60:3 (1967). 
132. Rodri!Juez, 605 F.:3d at 708. See also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 
(1925); id. at 673 (Holmes, .J., dissenting). 
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1. Educational institutions must recognize student groups that 
advocate for or against same-sex marriage 
Similarly, public schools and universities must recogmze 
student organizations that advocate for or against same-sex 
marriage. Since there is "no doubt that the First Amendment 
rights of speech and association extend to [public educational 
institutions]," 133 "the mere disagreement of the [institution] 
with the group's philosophy affords no reason to deny it 
recognition" 134 or funding. 135 In granting recognition and/or 
funding, the school or university does not adopt the group's 
speech as its own 136 or "confer any imprimatur of state 
approval" on the student group. 137 If there were disagreement 
with the message of the student groups, then, "[other] students 
and faculty are free to associate to voice their disapproval of 
the [student organization's] message." 13 X Indeed, in the higher 
education context, the practice of requiring students to pay 
mandatory fees that are distributed to student groups is 
permissible only if institutions do not favor particular 
viewpoints. 139 Simply stated, the "avowed purpose" for granting 
official status to student organizations is supposed to be "to 
provide a forum in which students can exchange ideas." 140 
Thus, groups with racist, sexist, homophobic, anti-Semitic, and/ 
or anti-Christian views are entitled to recognition, access to 
facilities, and funding. 141 
13:1. Widmar v. Vincent, 151 U.S. 263, 269 (1981). 
134. Healy v. Janw~. ·101-l U.S. 169, 187-i-li-l (1972). 
135. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. i-319, i-331 (1995). 
136. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000). 
137. Widmar, 154 U.S. at 274. 
138. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & lnst'lRights, 547 U.S. 17, 69-70 (2006). 
139. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 233-34. 
140. Widmar, 151 U.S. at 272 n.10. See also Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229 (student 
activity fee was designed to facilitate the free and open exchange of ideas by, and 
among, its students); RosenberJ:er, 515 U.S. at s:l1 (university funded student 
organizations to "encourage a diversity of views from private speakers"). 
141. While institutions may not refuse to recognize student organizations due to 
their viewpoints. they may requine organization to (1) obey the campus rules; (2) 
refrain from disrupting classes; and (3) obey all applicable fl,deral, state. and local 
laws. WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA H. LEE, THE LAW OF HJ<:HEJ< EOUCATI0"-1 1051 
(4th eel. 2007) (intl,rpreting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 1()9 (1972)). As a practical 
matter, this means that institutions can impose some neutral criteria for recognition 
such as having a faculty advisor, a constitution, and a certain number of members. 
Even so, institutions cannot <hmy recognition simply because officials or a significant 
part of the campus community dislik<'s the organization. Mon,over, according to Healy, 
institutions may not <kny recognition because mem])(,rs of organizations at other 
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2. State constitutional provisions may allow student groups to 
exclude those who disagree with the group's viewpoints 
Of course, as a matter of federal constitutional law, 
educational institutions may require student groups that favor 
or oppose same-sex marriage to admit members who hold the 
opposite view as a condition of recognizing the student 
organization. In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 142 a 
sharply divided Supreme Court held that officials at a public 
institution in California might require an on campus religious 
group to admit all-comers from the student body, including 
those who disagree with its beliefs, as a condition of being 
recognized. 143 Put another way, the Court declared that the 
government, through university officials, might force religious 
groups to choose between compromising their values and 
receiving benefits that other student groups receive as a matter 
of constitutional right. While the government "surely could not 
demand that all Christian groups admit members who believe 
that Jesus was merely human," 144 the government "may 
impose these very same requirements on students who wish to 
participate in a forum that is designed to foster the expression 
of diverse viewpoints." 145 In other words, what the Constitution 
forbids government from doing directly, it may accomplish 
indirectly by restricting access to the limited-public forum. 146 
Yet, while Christian Legal Society resolves the issue as a 
matter of federal constitutional law, it does not definitively 
resolve the issue of whether educational institutions may force 
student groups to admit those who disagree with the group's 
ideology. Because state constitutions often are more protective 
campuses or in the outside community engaged in certain conduct. Healy, 408 U.S. at 
185-1-\6. 
112. LlO S. Ct. 2971 (2010). For a comml;ntary on the casl' and its implications, see 
Thro & Russo, supra note 117. 
Hil. Christian Le!{al Soc:y, 130 S. Ct. at 2978. 
111. /d. at 3011 (i\lito, .J., joined hy ltoberts, C . .J., Scalia, .J. & Thomas, .J,J., 
dissenting). See also id. at 2997 (Stevens, .J., concurring). 
115. /d. at 3011 (i\lito, .J., joined hy Roberts, C.J., Scalia, ,J. & Thomas, JJ., 
dissenting). 
116. l'l;rry v. Sindermann,108 U.S. 59:3, 597 (1972) ("For if the government could 
deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected spm;ch or 
associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. 
This would allow the government to 'produce a result which (it) could not command 
directly.'"). See also O'Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake. 518 U.S. 712, 716-17 
(1996). 
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of individual liberty, 147 a student group may have a state 
constitutional right to exclude those who disagree with the 
group's views. 14~ Indeed, since the Burger Court's decisions 
prompted a revival of state constitutional law in the early 
1970s, 149 "it would be most unwise these days not also to raise 
the state constitutional questions." 150 Although the issue 
apparently is one of national first impression, it would not be 
surprising if a state court determined that its state constitution 
prohibited the government from indirectly forcing an 
organization to admit members who disagreed with the 
organization's objectives. 151 Moreover, state religious freedom 
restoration acts 152 prohibit government from imposing a 
substantial burden on the free exercise of religion unless there 
is a compelling governmental interest pursued through the 
least restrictive means. 153 To the extent that a student group's 
position on same-sex marriage is the result of religious belief, 
these state laws seem to prohibit government from indirectly 
147. A.E. Dick Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, 1 EMEKGINC: 
ISSUES IN ST. CONS'!'. L. 1, 1~ (1988). 
148. State constitutions are fundamentally diffr,rent from the national 
Constitution-the national Constitution is a grant of power and the state constitutions 
are limitations on power. Hornbeck v. Somerset Cnty. Bd. of Educ., ~58 A.2d 758, 785 
(Md. 1983); Bd. of l~duc. v. Nyquist, 1:39 N.E.2d 359, il66 n.5 (N.Y. 1982). Thus, the 
presumptions concerning legislative authority are reversed. Congress may not act 
unless it can identify a specific enumerated power, United States v. Morrison. 529 U.S. 
598, 607 (2000), but the state legislature may act unless there is an explicit restriction. 
Almond v. R.I. Lottpry Comm'n, 756 A.2d 186, 196 (IU. 2000). 
1~9. See A E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Da.v of 
the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 87:3 (1976). 
150. William .J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the l'rotection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. ~89, 502 (1977). 
151. Indeed, after the U.S. Supreme Court diminished religious freedom in Smith, 
several state courts held that the state constitutions provided greater protection for 
religious freedom. See Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge Of 
Allegiance, And Religious l-iberty: Avoiding The 8xtremes, 118 HI\IW. L. R~;v. 155, 211-
12 (2004) (discussing cases). 
152. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. i\NN. §§ 41-1493 through H9:Ul2 (2011); CONN. GE:-.1. 
STAT. § 52-571b (2010); FLA. STAT. §§ 761.01 through .Ofi (2011); lllAHO CODE i\:-.JN. §§ 
73-401 through 7:l-~0~ (2010); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. :l5/1-9H (201 0); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 
1.302 through .:107 (2010); N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 28-22-1 through 28-22-5 (2010); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 51, §§ 251-258 (2010); 71 PA. CO:-.IS. STXI'. §§ 2~01-2~07 (2010); R.I. GE:-.1. 
LAWS§§ 42-80.1-1 through ~2.80.1-1 (2010); S.C. COllE i\NN. §§ 1<l2-10 through 1-32-
60 (2010); TENN. COllE i\NN. § ~-1-407 (2010); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE i\:-.JN. §§ 
110.001 through 110.012 (West 2009); UTAH CODEi\NN. §§ G:ll-5-101 through 631-5-40il 
(LexisNexis 2010); VA. CoDEi\NN. §§ 57-1 through 57-2.02(2011). 
153. See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Freedom After Gonzales, 55 S.D. L. REV. 
467, 4 76 (2011); ,James W. Wright, ,Jr., Note, Mahing State Religious Freedom 
Restoration Amendments l~ffective, 61 ALA. L. REV. 125, 126 (201 0). 
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forcing the inclusion of dissenters. In sum, state law may 
prohibit what Christian Legal Society permits. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Americans define our Nation not by language, religion, 
blood, or place, but by two self-evident truths-that all "are 
created equal" and that the Creator has endowed us with 
"inalienable rights." 154 Under our Constitution, government 
may not deny either truth. In affirming equality, the state 
must not deny freedom of individuals. In upholding freedom, 
government must not diminish equality. As our society 
confronts profound questions regarding same-sex marriage, our 
public schools and universities must ensure that homosexuals 
enjoy full dignity regardless of whether the state recognizes 
same-sex marriage. At the same, public education must affirm 
freedom-the rights of those who disagree with the state's 
position on same-sex marriage. By affirming both equality and 
freedom, public education unites the constitutional community. 
That is the heart of the constitutional enterprise. 
154. THE DECLARATION <W INimPENO~;NCE para.2 (U.S. 1776). 
